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CICERO

On Duties

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honourable even to mention them.[1] And so a wise man will not undertake such things for the sake of the republic, and indeed the republic will not want him to undertake them for its sake. But in fact it turns out conveniently that a situation could not arise where it would benefit the republic for such a man to perform any such deed.

(160) Let the following, then, be regarded as settled: when choosing between duties, the chief place is accorded to the class of duties grounded in human fellowship. Moreover, since well considered action will be the consequence of learning and good sense, acting with forethought is in fact more worthwhile than merely thinking sensibly.

So much for that subject. The topic has now been explained, so that it should not be difficult for any one asking a question about duties to see which should take precedence over another. Further, there are degrees of duties within social life itself; consequently, we can understand which takes precedence over which, that duties are owed first to the immortal gods, secondly to one's country, thirdly to one's parents and then down the scale to others.[2]

(161) From this brief discussion you may realize that men are often uncertain not only over whether something is honourable or dishonourable, but also over which is the more honourable of two honourable possibilities. Panaetius passed over this theme, as I said above. But now let us go on to the questions that still remain.

[1] C. may allude here (from memory or in a later insertion) to the work of Posidonius he ordered to help him with Book III: it contained a treatment of duties in particular circumstances (see Introduction, pp. xx–xxi). Posidonius could have considered there if some actions, usually shameful, could be correct where they would help one's country or mankind in general (cf. III.19, 30, 40, 90, 93, 95). III.90 provides an argument that would justify the view taken here, i.e. the long-term interests of one's country are *not* served by having citizens behave like this.

[2] The degrees of duty given here differ from the account in 53–8 in that they include the gods and omit specific mention of mankind in general. In 53 C. lists the degrees of fellowship in logical order, starting with the widest (mankind) and ending with the narrowest (marriage); in 54 he reverses the order to explain the origins of states. The degrees of duty in 58 follow neither the logical nor historical order, as they reflect benefits received and extent of dependence on us (58): in 52 and 58 it is strongly implied that country comes first and general humanity last. Here the gods are given priority over country, but the gods, though the source of the greatest benefits (II.11), cannot be repaid in 'whatever is necessary to support life' (58), only in piety (II.11) and observance of the social order they have ordained (III.28).

Start reading here.

Book II

(1) Marcus my son, I think that in the preceding book I have explained well enough the way in which duties are based on what is honourable and on each particular type of virtue. Next I must pursue the classes of duties that relate to civilized living and to the availability of the influence and wealth that men find beneficial. As I said before, we must ask both what is beneficial and what is the opposite, and then what is more or most beneficial of several beneficial possibilities. That is what I shall go on to discuss, but first let me say a few words both about my overall project and about my own view of philosophy.

(2) My books have inspired in some men a devotion not only to reading but also to writing. Occasionally, though, I still fear that some good men despise the very name of philosophy, and are amazed that I spend so much time and effort on it.[1] For my part, when the republic was being run by the men to whom it had entrusted itself, I devoted all my concern and all my thoughts to it. But then a single man came to dominate everything,[2] there was no longer any room for consultation or for personal authority, and finally I lost my allies in preserving the republic, excellent men as they were. Then I did not surrender to the grief that would have overwhelmed me had I not fought it, nor to pleasures unworthy of an educated man.

(3) I only wish that the republic had remained in its original con-

[1] C.'s apology is directed at the 'good men' in 2–6 and at the 'learned' in 7–8. See I.1 with n. 4. Of those inspired to *write*, the most notable was Marcus Terentius Varro, the greatest scholar of the time.

[2] One of the many allusions to Caesar's dictatorship (see Introduction, p. xii).

dition, rather than fall into the hands of men greedy not merely for change, but for revolution.[1] For first I would be devoting myself to action rather than writing, as I used to when the republic was standing. Secondly, it would be my own speeches rather than my present subject matter that I would be putting on paper, as I have often done before. All my care, all my thought, all my effort, used to be directed towards the republic; when that ceased completely to exist, then inevitably legal and senatorial speeches ceased to flow from my pen.

(4) But my mind could not be entirely inactive. Therefore, as I was versed in such studies from my youth, I thought that I could most honourably set aside my troubles by turning to philosophy. I had spent much time on this as a young man for the sake of education.[2] Later I began to take up the honourable burden of public office, and gave myself completely to public life. Now the only time I had for philosophy was that which I could spare after seeing to the needs of my friends and of the republic. All of that was used up in reading; I had no leisure for writing.

(5) From the greatest of evils I seem still to have salvaged a little good: I now have the chance to put into writing ideas that were not familiar enough to my countrymen, but most worthy of knowing. In heaven's name, what is more desirable, what more distinguished than wisdom? What is better for a man, what more worthy of a man? Those who seek it are called philosophers, and philosophy, if you want to translate it, is nothing other than the pursuit of wisdom.[3] Wisdom, according to the definition of the philosophers of old, is the knowledge of everything divine and human, and of the causes which regulate them. If anyone despises the pursuit of that, it is difficult to see what on earth he would see fit to praise.

(6) Perhaps it is mental entertainment that you want, and a break from your worries? Philosophers are constantly investigating anything that strives to promote a good and happy life; what pursuit could you compare with theirs? Or maybe your concern is constancy and virtue – if any discipline can attain those for us, it is this one. But

[1] C. refers to Antony and his supporters who implemented Caesar's policies after his death.

[2] C.'s study of philosophy began before he was twenty (see Introduction, p. x). Cf. 1.155 for the value of philosophy to statesmen.

[3] Greek *philosophia*, from *philos*, a friend or lover, and *sophia*, wisdom.

perhaps, for such very great matters, there is no such discipline? That suggestion, when even the most trivial of matters have their method, is the suggestion of a man who speaks without reflection, a man mistaken in the things that matter most. If, on the other hand, there is a way of learning about virtue, where could you find it if you rejected this field of study? When I am advocating the study of philosophy, as I have done in another book,[1] I usually discuss these things in more detail. Now, though, I only needed to explain why, deprived as I am of the obligations of public life, I have devoted myself primarily to this pursuit.[2]

(7) An objection is brought against me, and by educated men at that, who ask whether I seem to be acting quite consistently. For although I say that nothing can be securely grasped, I am still ready to discourse on various matters; and now indeed I am engaged in advising about duty. I should like them to learn my views satisfactorily. We are not the ones whose minds wander in uncertainty and who have nothing by which to direct themselves.[3] If we took away our grounds not only for arguing, but also for living, what would reason, indeed what would life be like? No, what we do is this: where other men say that some things are certain and others uncertain, we disagree with them and say rather that some things are persuasive and others not. **(8)** What, therefore, should prevent me from accepting what seems persuasive to me and rejecting the opposite, so avoiding the presumption of assertion and escaping the recklessness that is so far removed from wisdom? We argue against every opinion on the grounds that what is in fact persuasive could not be revealed unless the two competing sides of each case had been heard. I explained all this well enough, or so I think, in my *Academica*.[4]

My dear Cicero, although you are now studying so old and so distinguished a philosophy under Cratippus, who is not unworthy

[1] The *Hortensius*, now lost. Its impact on St Augustine is movingly described in his *Confessions* III.4.

[2] C. argues at e.g. 1.19, 1.28, 1.70–3 that those suited to public life have an obligation to participate and at 1.121 that we must be seen to have a good reason for changing our way of life: hence his *apologia* (see p. 8, n. 1).

[3] See p. 4, n. 1. C.'s target here is the Pyrrhonists (see Biographical Note under Pyrrho).

[4] C. was proud of this rather technical dialogue about the theory of knowledge, of which we have only the first book of the second edition and the second book of the first edition.

of that noble tradition's founders, I still wanted you to know something of the very similar tradition that I prefer.

But now let me proceed to my proposed topic.

(9) I laid down then,[1] you may recall, five methods for the accomplishment of duty, of which two related to seemliness and honourableness, and two to things advantageous for life – resources, wealth, power. The fifth was concerned with deciding what to choose in case those already mentioned seemed to conflict with one another. I have now completed the section with which I want you to be most familiar, that on honourableness. What I am going next to address is that which is labelled 'beneficial'. Custom has stumbled over this word and strayed from the path, gradually sinking to the point where she has severed honourableness from benefit, decreeing that something can be honourable which is not beneficial, and beneficial which is not honourable. Nothing more destructive than this custom could have been introduced into human life.

(10) It is indeed true that philosophers of the greatest authority make a distinction in thought between these two[2] kinds, combined though they are, and doubtless they do so honourably and strictly. For they hold that whatever is just is also beneficial, and again, whatever is honourable is also just. Therefore it follows that whatever is honourable is also beneficial. Those who do not see this clearly often admire shrewd and crafty men and mistake wickedness for wisdom. Theirs is an error that must be uprooted; and their fancy must be wholly converted to that hope which consists of the understanding that they will achieve what they want by honourable policies and just deeds, and not by deceit and wickedness.

(11) Of the things which concern the preservation of human life, some are inanimate, gold and silver, for example, the produce of the earth, and so forth, and some are animate, having their own drives and impulses. Of the latter, some do not share in reason, but others do use it. Horses, cattle and other herd animals, and bees, all of whose efforts contribute something to the needs of human life, are without reason. There are two groups which use reason: gods

[1] In 1.9–10.

[2] The manuscripts read 'these three kinds, combined' or 'these three things, combined in kind'. Holden explains that the three things are (i) the honourable, (ii) the beneficial, and (iii) the honourable and beneficial. But C. is talking about only two things, the honourable and the beneficial: better then to emend 'three' to 'two'.

and men.[1] The gods are placated by devoutness and sacred observance. Next to the gods, however, and close after them, it is men who can bring most benefit to other men.

(12) Things that are harmful or disadvantageous can be divided in the same way. But here the gods are excepted because they are not thought to do harm. Therefore, it is reckoned, the greatest source of disadvantage to mankind is other men. The things we have called inanimate are generally produced by man's efforts; we should not have them without the application of craft and manipulative skills, nor should we enjoy them without human organization.[2] Neither medical care, nor navigation, nor agriculture, nor the harvest and storage of fruits and other crops could have existed without the effort of man. **(13)** Then, there would surely be no exporting of that which we have in excess, nor importing of that which we need, if these services were not performed by men. Nor, by the same reasoning, would the stones required for our needs be quarried from the earth, nor

> the iron, copper, gold and silver hidden deep within

be dug out unless by the labour of men's hands. Consider our houses, which repel the biting frosts and abate the oppressive heat: how could they have been provided for the human race in the first place? And how afterwards, if they collapsed through storm, through earthquake, or through age, could they have been repaired, had not a common way of life taught us in such cases to seek assistance from other men? **(14)** You may add aqueducts, diversions of rivers, the irrigation of fields, breakwaters, artificial harbours: how could we have those without the work of man?

From these and many other instances, it is clear that without the labour of men's hands we could not in any way have acquired the fruits and benefits that are culled from inanimate objects. Finally, what fruit or advantage could be culled from animals, unless men gave us assistance? For those who were foremost in discovering what use we could make of each beast were, without doubt, men; and

[1] The argument ascends the 'ladder of nature'. Plants are 'inanimate' in not having the power of locomotion (cf. 1.11).

[2] See p. 61, n. 1. That the arts of civilization could be abused, leading to luxury and political turmoil, was often argued in antiquity and had recently been by Lucretius, *On the Nature of Things* v.1106 ff.

even now we could not feed them nor tame them nor protect them nor take from them their fruits in due season without human labour. By man too, are harmful animals killed and those which can be of use captured.

(15) Why do I need to enumerate the multitude of arts without which there could be no life at all? What assistance would be given to the sick, what delights would there be for the healthy, what sustenance or comfort, if there were not so many arts to minister to us? It is because of these that the civilized life of men differs so greatly from the sustenance and the comforts that animals have. Nor indeed could cities have been built or populated if men did not gather together. As a result, laws and customs were established, and a fair system of justice and a regular training for the business of life. These led to a softening of men's spirits and a sense of shame; the result was that life became less vulnerable, and through giving and receiving, through sharing our abilities and advantages, we came to lack nothing.

(16) I have dwelt longer on this point than is necessary. But is there anyone to whom the facts that Panaetius related at great length are not obvious[1] – that no one, whether a general in war or a leading statesman at home, could have accomplished deeds of great service without the support of his fellow-men? He recalls Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Alexander, denying that their great achievements would have been possible without other men's co-operation. He calls unnecessary witnesses, although the matter is not in doubt. On the other hand, just as we secure great benefits because men collaborate and agree, conversely there is no truly pernicious curse that is not brought upon man by man. Dicaearchus, that great and prolific Peripatetic, has written a book about the destruction of mankind. In this he gathers together the other causes of death such as floods, epidemics, devastation, sudden stampedes of wild creatures whose onslaught, as he teaches us, has wiped out whole tribes of men. Then he shows by comparison how many more men have been destroyed by attacks by other men, that is in war or uprisings, than by every other type of disaster.

(17) Thus there can be no doubt on this question, that it is men who inflict on their fellow-men both the greatest benefit and the great-

[1] See Introduction, p. xix for C.'s condensation of Panaetius' work. Aulus Gellius (*Attic Nights*, 13.28) preserves a passage of Panaetius' book that is represented by only a brief reference in *De Officiis* 1.81.

est harm. Therefore I count it as the special property of virtue to make its own the hearts of other men and to enlist them in its own service. Consequently, whatever benefit to human life arises from inanimate things or from the use and management of animals is attributed to the manual arts; it is the wisdom and virtue of outstanding persons, however, that inspire other men to be prompt, ready and devoted in assisting our advancement.

(18) Indeed, virtue as a whole may be said practically to depend upon three things. One is perceiving what is true and clear in each case, what agrees with, or what follows from, what, what gives rise to each thing, what is the cause of each thing. The second is restraining the disturbed movements of the spirit (which the Greeks call *pathe*) and making the impulses (which they call *hormai*) obedient to reason.[1] The third is treating those with whom we associate knowledgeably and with moderation in order that their support may secure for us the requirements of nature in full and ample measure; and that if any disadvantage threatens to afflict us, we may, through the same men, avert it, and avenge ourselves on those who have attempted to harm us, inflicting such punishment as fairness and humanity allow.

(19) Shortly, I will discuss the methods by which we can acquire the ability to embrace and retain the support of other men, but before that I must briefly mention something else. Can anyone be unaware of the great power of fortune, which impels one in either direction, towards success or towards adversity? Whenever we enjoy her prospering breezes we are carried to the haven for which we long; when she blows in our face we are wrecked. To fortune again belong such occasional mishaps as squalls, storms, shipwrecks, collapse of buildings and conflagrations which have inanimate causes, and then the blows, bites and attacks of animals. But these, as I said, are comparatively rare. **(20)** Then on the one hand take the destruction of armies (three lately,[2] and often, on other occasions, many) and the downfall of generals (recently of an excellent and exceptional man)[3] and take also that resentment from the masses which has often led to the exile, ruin or flight of deserving citizens.[4] Take on the other hand success,

[1] See 1.101 with n. 1.

[2] The three armies are those of Pompey at Pharsalus (9 August 48), of his eldest son at Munda in Spain (6 April 46) and of Metellus Scipio at Thapsus in Africa (17 March 45), all defeated by Julius Caesar.

[3] Pompey (see Biographical Note).

[4] C. may have in mind his own 18 months' exile in 58–7 BC.

civil honours, military commands and victories: though all these are indeed subject to fortune, in neither case can they be effected without the resources and assiduous support of other men.

Now that that point has been understood, I must discuss how we can entice and arouse other men to support what is beneficial to us. If my lecture is overlong, let it be compared with the greatness of the benefit in question; then perhaps it will seem all too brief.

(21) Insofar as men assist another in promoting his position or honour, they may do so either out of good will, when for some reason they are fond of him; or for honour, if they look up to his virtue and consider him to be worthy of the most magnificent fortune; or because they have faith in him, and judge that they are taking good care of their own interests; or because they fear his power; or on the other hand if they have expectations of someone, as happens when kings or *populares*[1] propose lavish distributions; or finally they are attracted by financial reward.[2] That is the most sordid and impure of reasons both for those who are held in its grip and for those who try to resort to it; **(22)** for things are in a bad way when what ought to be achieved through virtue is attempted by means of money. Since, however, there are times when such assistance is necessary, I shall talk about how it should be used. But first I shall discuss those matters that are closer to virtue.

There are a variety of reasons also why men submit themselves to the command or power of another. For they may be attracted either by goodwill or by the greatness of his previous kind services; or because the man has a very high standing; or perhaps by the hope that such a choice will be beneficial for them; or by fear that they may be compelled by force to obey; or else they may be won over by the hope or promise of lavish distributions; or finally, as we often see in this republic of ours, they may be hired for pay.[3]

(23) But there is nothing at all more suited to protecting and retain-

[1] See p. 34, n. 2. On demagoguery in kings, see II.53 and 80. C. objects to such politically motivated handouts at I.42–3, II.72–3, II.78–85.

[2] Goodwill is discussed at 32, honour at 36–8, faith at 33–4; fear at 23–9, distributions and financial reward at 52–85. The six factors recur in a more sinister form in 22 as reasons for giving not just support but submission to non-Republican political domination.

[3] See Introduction, pp. xii–xiii on Caesar's acts as dictator and on Antony's and Octavian's appeal to Caesar's veterans and other beneficiaries of Caesar's liberality.

ing influence than to be loved, and nothing less suited than to be feared. For, as Ennius splendidly puts it:

> They hate the men they fear; and whom one hates one would have dead.

Indeed no amount of influence can withstand the hatred of a large number of men. That, if it was unrecognized before, is certainly recognized now.[1] It is not only the death of that tyrant, whom the city endured under force of arms (and still obeys to a great extent though he is dead), that declares the power of men's hatred to destroy. Many tyrants have met a similar end; indeed hardly one has escaped such a death. Fear is a poor guardian over any length of time; but goodwill keeps faithful guard for ever.

(24) Admittedly those who exercise a command over men constrained only by force may need to employ severity, just as a master must towards his servants if he cannot otherwise control them.[2] But that those who live in a free city should contrive to be feared – could anyone be more insane? For however swamped the laws may be by some individual's influence, however freedom herself may cower, still the time comes when they rise up, through silent judgements or in the secret elections to positions of honour. Freedom will bite back more fiercely when suspended than when she remains undisturbed. Let us therefore embrace the course that extends the most widely; and that is the strongest to secure not only safety, but also influence and power, so that fear may be absent but love preserved. That is how we will most easily achieve what we want both in private matters and in public affairs. For those who wish to be feared cannot but themselves be afraid of the very men who fear them.

(25) The elder Dionysius had his hair singed with coals because he feared the barber's knife. What tormenting fears do we imagine must continually have racked him? In what spirit do we imagine Alexander of Pherae must have spent his life? He, as we read, though he loved his wife Thebe greatly, even so when he came to her in

[1] See Introduction, p. xii on the references to Caesar's murder. C. implicitly denies Caesar's famous clemency which C. himself had praised in *Pro Marcello*.

[2] This passage might seem to conflict with I.41 (see n. 3) and reflect instead the Peripatetic view that there are natural slaves who need to be controlled by force, not ruled by consent as citizens are. But, in contrast with C.'s exploration of that view in *De Re Publica* III.37–8, he says here that force is to be used *only if necessary*, and he limits his comparison to rulers of free states.

her room from the feast used to order a barbarian (indeed one marked with Thracian tattoos, so it is said!) to precede him with drawn sword, and used to send attendants before him to search the lady's caskets and to check that no weapon be hidden in her clothes. Wretched man, to hold a barbarian, a tattooed slave, more faithful than your wife! Nor was he deceived. She herself did indeed kill him, suspecting that he had a mistress.

Nor is there any military power so great that it can last for long under the weight of fear. **(26)** Phalaris is a witness to that. His cruelty is notorious beyond all others, and he died not by ambush (as Alexander did, whom I have just mentioned) nor at the hands of a few men (as our own friend);[1] instead the entire population of Agrigentum assailed him as one. What then of Demetrius? Did not all the Macedonians abandon him and transfer themselves to Pyrrhus? And what of Sparta's allies, who almost universally deserted her unjust command, playing at the disaster of Leuctra the role of spectators and men of leisure?[2]

In such a matter it gives me more pleasure to recall foreign examples than ones from home. But as long as the empire of the Roman people was maintained through acts of kind service and not through injustices, wars were waged either on behalf of allies or about imperial rule; wars were ended with mercy or through necessity;[3] the senate was a haven and refuge for kings, for peoples and for nations; moreover, our magistrates and generals yearned to acquire the greatest praise from one thing alone, the fair and faithful defence of our provinces and of our allies. **(27)** In this way we could more truly have been titled a protectorate[4] than an empire of the world.

We had already begun gradually to erode this custom and practice; but after the victory of Sulla we rejected it entirely. For when our citizens had suffered such great cruelty, there then ceased to be anything that seemed unjust towards allies. In Sulla's case, dishonourable

[1] Julius Caesar, of course. There were more than 60 conspirators in the assassination plot. We know the names of 16 including Brutus and Cassius.

[2] The Thebans under Epaminondas defeated Sparta in 371 BC, liberating the Arcadians and the Messenians who had endured prolonged subjection working as slaves (known as Helots) on their confiscated lands. See p. 95, n. 1.

[3] See p. 17, n. 1. The defensive aspect of wars for empire is brought out by linking them with wars to defend Rome's allies. But C. knew that Rome had often expanded its empire by defending allies it had chosen to acquire (*Rep.* III.35).

[4] 'Protectorate' here translates *patrocinium*, the abstract noun for the relationship of patron to client or ex-slave, used here metaphorically for the relation of ruling state to subject.

victory succeeded an honourable cause: for he planted his spear in the forum[1] and sold the property of good men and rich men, and men who were at the very least citizens, daring to proclaim that he was selling his own booty. There followed a man whose cause was unrighteous and whose victory fouler still; he did not confiscate the property of individual citizens, but embraced entire countries and provinces under a single law of ruin. **(28)** That is why we see Massilia being carried around in a triumphal procession as an example to oppressed and devastated nations abroad of the empire we have forfeited.[2] That is why we see a triumph being celebrated over the very city without which our generals themselves could never have achieved a triumph for their wars beyond the Alps. I should relate many other iniquities inflicted upon our allies, had ever the sun seen anything unworthier than that particular one. Our present sufferings are, therefore, just. For if we had not tolerated the crimes of many men going unpunished, such extreme licence would never have come into the hands of one. His estate indeed was inherited by only a few; but there were many wicked heirs to his greedy desires.[3]

(29) The seed and occasion of civil wars will be present for as long as desperate men remember and hope for that bloody spear. Publius Sulla shook it when his kinsman was dictator; and again thirty-six years later he did not withdraw from a still more criminal spear. Yet another, who was a clerk in that former dictatorship, was urban quaestor in the next.[4] From this it ought to be understood

[1] A reference to the proscriptions in which Sulla outlawed his enemies in the civil war and confiscated their property, either giving it to supporters or selling it. Sales by auction took place near a spear stuck in the ground.

[2] Massilia, the modern Marseilles, was a Greek colony which had become an ally of Rome even before Gaul became a Roman province. It was captured by Caesar in the civil war because it favoured Pompey's cause. Models of captured towns were carried in the triumphal procession (see p. 31, n. 2). Cf. *Att.* XIV.14.6 for C.'s reaction at the time.

[3] The principal of the three heirs to his estate was C. Octavius his grand-nephew (the later Emperor Augustus). The 'heirs to his desires' are probably Antony and his friends in particular.

[4] See I.43 with n. 2. Publius Cornelius Sulla presided over the sale of confiscated property in 82 BC and 36 years later in 46 BC. 'Another' is Cornelius Sulla, an ex-slave of the dictator who served him as secretary and held the quaestorship (a largely financial office and the first on the ladder of senatorial magistracies) under Caesar. Cf. *Philippics* II.64 for the auctioning of Pompey's property.

that when such prizes are offered there will never be a lack of civil wars. And so only the walls of the city remain standing – and they themselves now fear the excesses of crime. The republic we have utterly lost. And we have fallen into this disaster – for I must return to my proposition – because we prefer to be feared than to be held dear and loved.[1] If these things could have happened to the Roman people when they ruled unjustly, what ought individuals to think? Since, then, it is obvious that the power of goodwill is great, and that of fear feeble, we must next discuss the ways in which we can most easily acquire, with honour and faithfulness, the love that we desire.

(30) But we do not all need these equally. For whether a man needs to be loved by many, or whether a few will be enough, must be determined by the life he has adopted. Let this be taken as fixed and primary and most necessary, that one should have faithful companionships with friends who love us and who esteem our qualities. For this is one thing in which there is no great difference between outstanding and ordinary men, and it must be acquired almost equally by both of them. **(31)** All men, perhaps, do not equally need honour, glory, the citizens' goodwill. However, if these do fall to anyone's lot, they are quite helpful (among other things) in acquiring friendships.[2]

But I have spoken about friendship in another book, which is entitled *Laelius*. Now let me discuss glory. There are indeed two books of mine on this subject also, but let us touch upon it as it is of the greatest assistance in conducting matters of importance.[3] The peak and perfection of glory lies in the following three things: if the masses love you, if they have faith in you, if they think you worthy of some honour combined with admiration. These, if I must speak simply and briefly, are brought forth from the masses by almost the same things as they are from individuals. But there is also another approach

[1] Since C. cannot actually claim that Rome's misrule, like Sparta's, lost her the control or allegiance of her subjects (cf. II.75), he argues that her misrule encouraged misconduct at home, resulting in civil war and the loss of the Republic.

[2] Goodwill, faith and honour are about to be discussed as means to glory, which is only relevant to 'outstanding men'. C. pauses to mention the form of support from their fellows that all men can achieve, friendship.

[3] The *De Gloria*, written earlier than the *Laelius* in this year, is lost.

to the masses, which enables us to infiltrate, so to speak, into the hearts of everyone together.[1]

(32) First, then, of the three I have listed, let us look at advice concerning goodwill. This is secured most of all by kind services; but secondly, goodwill is aroused by the willingness to provide kind service, even if ones's resources are not, perhaps, adequate for it. A vigorous love is aroused in the masses, however, by the very reputation and rumour of liberality, of beneficence, of justice, of keeping faith, and of all the virtues that are associated with gentleness and easiness of conduct. For, because the very thing we call honourable and seemly pleases us in itself, and moves the hearts of all by its nature and appearance, shining out brightly, so to speak, from the virtues that I have mentioned – because of that, when we think people possess these virtues, we are compelled by nature to love them. These indeed are the weightiest causes of loving; for there may be a few more trivial ones besides.

(33) We can bring it about in two ways that others have faith in us: if we are deemed to possess both good sense and justice combined with it. For we have faith in those whom we judge to understand more than us, whom we believe can foresee the future, able when the issue arises and the crisis arrives, to settle the matter, adopting the counsel that suits the circumstance. For men reckon that such good sense as that is useful and genuine. As for just and faithful men, however, that is good men,[2] one has such faith in them that no suspicion of deceit or injustice arises. That is why we think that we are absolutely right to entrust to them our safety, our fortunes, and our children. **(34)** Of the two, justice has more power to win faith; indeed although it has authority enough even without good sense, good sense without justice is of no avail in inspiring faith. The more cunning and clever a man is, the more he is hated and suspected if deprived of the reputation of integrity. The result is that justice combined with intelligence will have as much power as it wishes to win faith. Justice without good sense will be able to do much; without justice, good sense will avail not at all.

(35) Someone may be wondering why, although it is argued by all philosophers, and I myself have frequently argued it, that whoever

[1] Cf. 44–51 on how to bring our qualities to general notice.

[2] See I.20 with n. 1.

has one virtue has them all, I now separate them, as if someone who has no sense could at the same time be just.[1] One degree of precision is required when truth herself is debated and refined, but another when speech is entirely adapted to common opinion. For this reason we speak here just as ordinary men do, calling some men brave, others good, others sensible. For when we discuss popular opinion we must use popular and familiar words, in the very way that Panaetius did.[2]

But let us return to our subject.

(36) Of the three things that related to glory, the third was that other men should judge us worthy of both their honour and their admiration. In general men admire everything they notice that is great and beyond their expectation; in particular, if they see in individuals any good things that take them by surprise. Therefore they look up to and lavish great praise upon those men in whom they think they see outstanding and exceptional virtues; but they look down upon and despise those whom they think have no virtue, nor spirit, nor vigour. (For they do not despise everyone of whom they think ill. They do not despise those they think wicked, slanderous, deceitful, or equipped to commit injury; they certainly do, however, think ill of them.) Therefore, as I said before, those who are despised are the men who 'help not themselves nor another', as the saying goes; they have in them no industriousness, no diligence, no concern.

(37) On the other hand men are regarded with admiration if they are thought to excel others in virtue, not only being free from all dishonour, but also resisting even those vices that others cannot easily resist. For pleasures themselves, those most alluring of mistresses, twist the hearts of most men away from virtue; and when the flames of pain are kindled most men are frightened beyond measure. Both life and death, both riches and poverty, powerfully perturb all men.

[1] *Fin.* v.66; *Tusc.* III.14; *Acad.* 1.38. C. raises the issue in considering justice and good sense (the practical aspect of wisdom, I.153) because Carneades had attacked the idea that virtue, especially justice, and wisdom were compatible. C. had answered the point, particularly as regards states, in *De Re Publica* III.32ff.; as regards individuals, see below, III.40–96, especially 50–78, 89–92.

[2] The Stoics were charged with violating common usage as in the famous Stoic paradoxes and their idea that external advantages were not 'goods'. C. praises Panaetius for making concessions to ordinary language and notions in *De Finibus* IV.79.

But as for those who look down with a great and lofty spirit upon prosperity and adversity alike, especially when some grand and honourable matter is before them, which converts them wholly to itself and possesses them, who then will fail to admire the splendour and beauty of virtue? **(38)** Therefore, a spirit contemptuous in this way arouses great admiration; and justice most of all seems something admirable to the crowd; on account of that virtue alone are men called 'good'. And not unjustly: for no one can be just if he fears death, or pain, or exile, or need; or if he prefers their opposites to fairness. Men whom money does not move are also most greatly admired. If that quality is observed in someone, they regard him as having been tested by fire.[1]

To sum up then, the three things which I laid down as means to glory are all achieved by justice: goodwill, because it desires to benefit many; and for the same reason faithfulness; and admiration, because it scorns and ignores the very things towards which most men, inflamed by greed, are dragged.

(39) In my opinion, at least, every rational method or plan of life requires the assistance of other men, first of all so that one has others with whom one can share in friendly discussions. That is difficult if you do not present the appearance of a good man. The reputation for justice is necessary also even for a solitary man, or one who lives his life in the country; and all the more so because if they do not have it, having no defence at all to protect them they will have many injustices inflicted upon them.

(40) Justice is necessary also, so that they may carry out their business, for those who sell or buy, who hire or let, and who are involved in commercial transactions in general. Its effect is so great that not even those who win their bread from evil-doing and crime are able to live without any particle of justice. For if anyone steals or snatches something from one of his fellows in banditry, he leaves no place for himself even within the gang of bandits. And if the one called the pirate chief does not share the booty fairly, he will be killed or abandoned by his comrades. Indeed they say that there are even laws

[1] On the 'good' man, see p. 9, n. 1. The allusion to fire is to the testing of gold, for it was believed that only that metal was incombustible (Pliny *NH* XXXIII.59) and that its quality could be measured by observing the time it took to become incandescent.

among bandits which they obey and respect.[1] And so it was because of his fair distribution of booty that Bardulis, the Illyrian bandit, of whom we hear in Theopompus, had great influence, and Viriathus the Lusitanian much greater. Indeed our own generals and their armies surrendered to the latter. (It was Laelius, the one nicknamed 'the wise', who as praetor broke and crushed him, repressing his ferocity to such an extent that he left an easy war to his successors.)[2]

Justice has such great effect that it strengthens and increases the resources even of bandits. How great an effect, then, do we think it will have among laws and lawcourts and in a well ordered political community?

(41) It seems to me that it was not only among the Medes (as Herodotus tells us),[3] but also among our ancestors, that once upon a time men of good character were established as kings in order that justice might be enjoyed. For when the needy masses were being oppressed by those who had greater wealth, they fled together to some one man who excelled in virtue. When he protected the weaker from injustice, fairness was established, and he held the highest and the lowest under an equality of justice. The establishment of laws and the institution of kings had the same cause. **(42)** For a system of justice that is fair is what has always been sought: otherwise it would not be justice. As long as they secured this from a single just and good man, with that they were content. When it ceased to be so, laws were invented, which always spoke to everyone with one and the same voice.[4]

This, therefore, is manifest: the men who are usually chosen to

[1] *Latro* (bandit) is used to cover a broad spectrum of people who threaten the social order by violence but are regarded neither as criminals to be dealt with by due process of law nor as legitimate enemies with whom formal war is waged. C. here, and in III.107, adduces pirates as the central case because of the scale of the nuisance and of the operations against it in his own lifetime: in this very year there had been a resurgence of the problem (*Att.* XVI.1.3).

[2] The Romans often described as bandits native bands within Roman provinces whom the governor had not succeeded in controlling (cf. C. writing to his brother in *QFr.* I.1.28). Like Bardulis and Viriathus, these bandits were sometimes guerrilla fighters opposing the rule of Rome. After Laelius' successes, Viriathus continued to cause Roman reverses until dealt with by treachery and assassination.

[3] Herodotus (1.96) describes how Deioces, who was famed for his just decisions, was made king by the Medes because they found that, when he ceased to give judgement, crime and anarchy increased.

[4] This schematic account of the rise and fall of the Roman monarchy adapts Roman history to a general account of political development such as Posidonius devised (Seneca, *Letter* 90.5). As Book II of C.'s *De Re Publica* shows, the Romans actually thought there were laws in operation under the kings, some of whom were great legislators.

rule are those who have a great reputation among the masses for justice. If in addition, indeed, they were thought also to be men of good sense, there was nothing that men would think they could not achieve under their leadership. Therefore justice must be cultivated and maintained by every method, both for its own sake (for otherwise it would not be justice) and for the sake of enhancing one's honour and glory. There is a rational method both of seeking money and of investing it, which ensures a continuous supply not merely of necessary, but even of liberal, expenditure; in a similar way, then, glory must be both sought and invested methodically.

(43) And yet, as Socrates declared splendidly,[1] the nearest path to glory, a short cut so to speak, is to behave in such a way that one is what one wishes to be thought. For men who think that they can secure for themselves unshakeable glory by pretence and empty show, by dissembling in speech and countenance, are wildly mistaken. True glory takes root and spreads its branches too; but everything false drops swiftly down like blossom; and pretence can never endure. There are witnesses in plenty to both those points, but for brevity's sake one family will suffice us. For Tiberius Gracchus, the son of Publius, will be praised as long as the memory of Roman deeds endures. His sons, however, while alive did not win the approval of good men; and now that they are dead they are numbered among those who were justly cut down. If anyone wishes, then, to win true glory, let him fulfil the duties of justice. And what they are, I have said in my first book.

(44) The greatest effect is achieved, then, by being what we wish to seem; however some advice should be given so that we might as easily as is possible be seen to be what we are. For if anyone from his early youth has cause to become famous and renowned, whether as the heir of his father (as I think has happened to you, my dear Cicero!) or through any other chance or fortune, the eyes of all are cast on him. They examine whatever he does, the very way in which he lives; he is, as it were, bathed in so brilliant a light that no single word or deed of his can be hidden. **(45)** Others, on the other hand, because of their humble and obscure background, spend their youth unknown by other men. As soon as they become young men, they ought to set their sights on great things and strive for them with

[1] Recounted by Xenophon in *Memoirs of Socrates* II.39.

unswerving devotion. They can do that with a steadier spirit because at that age they will not only not be envied, but will even meet with favour. Youth wins commendation primarily for any glory it may be able to gain in warfare. Many of our ancestors so distinguished themselves. For them wars were waged almost continuously. Your own youth, however, falls at the time of a war in which one of the sides possessed too much wickedness, the other too little luck. However, when Pompey put you in charge of a cavalry squadron in that war you won great praise, and that both from an outstanding man and from the army, by your horsemanship, your spear-throwing, and your endurance of every military hardship.[1] But the praise that was yours fell together with the republic. However, the subject of my discourse is not you, but this whole topic. And so let us proceed to what remains.

(46) Just as in other matters the efforts of the spirit are far more important than those of the body, here too the achievements of talent and reason win more gratitude than those of strength. One wins commendation primarily, then, for modesty, along with reverence for parents and goodwill to one's family and friends. Young men become known most easily, however, and in the best way, by attaching themselves to such famous and wise men as concern themselves with the good of the political community. By associating with such as these, they will inspire in the people the belief that they too will become like those whom they have chosen to imitate. **(47)** His visits to the house of Publius Mucius commended Publius Rutilius to public opinion as a person of integrity and of legal knowledge, while he was but a young man. But Lucius Crassus, when he was still a youth, did not borrow from elsewhere, but won for himself the greatest of praise for that noble and glorious prosecution of his. At an age when doing exercises normally wins praise, the young Crassus, like Demosthenes, as we are told, showed that he could already accomplish superbly in the forum things for which he could at the time have been praised for studying at home.[2]

Stop reading here.

[1] C. comes close to accepting here what he deplores at 1.74 and 11.46, that military glory counted for most at Rome. Young Cicero served at the age of 16–17 under Pompey in 49–8 in the civil war against Caesar.

[2] Lucius Licinius Crassus, C.'s Roman model as an orator, as Demosthenes was his Greek, was only twenty-one years old when he accused C. Papirius Carbo (cf. 11.49) and drove him to suicide. C. pleaded his first public case in 80 BC at the age of twenty-six, preferring not to learn on the job (*Brutus* 311).

(48) There are two methods of speaking; under one falls conversation, under the other debate. There is no doubt that debate has the greater effect when glory is the object (for that is what we mean by eloquence). It is however difficult to say to what extent friendliness and an approachable manner of conversation will win over men's hearts. We have the letters which Philip wrote to Alexander, which Antipater wrote to Cassander, and which Antigonus wrote to his son Philip, the letters of three of the most sensible of men (for that is what we are told). In these they give the advice to woo the hearts of the crowds to goodwill with friendly talk, and to soothe their soldiers in conversation by gently beseeching them. But often when a speech is delivered to the masses in a debate, it arouses the whole crowd. Great indeed is the admiration aroused by an eloquent and wise speaker, whose hearers judge him wiser, and more understanding too, than the rest. And if in such a speech there is also a weightiness blended with modesty, then no achievement can be more admirable; and all the more so if these qualities are found in a young man.

(49) There are many types of case which call for eloquence, and in our republic many young men have won praise by speaking before the jurors, before the people, and before the senate. But the greatest admiration is inspired in lawsuits. The method required here is twofold, as it consists of prosecution and of defence. Defence is indeed more likely to win praise, but frequently too a prosecution is approved. I mentioned Crassus just now. Marcus Antonius as a young man did the same. It was a prosecution also that brought to light the eloquence of Publius Sulpicius, when he summoned to court Gaius Norbanus, a seditious and worthless citizen.

(50) This should not, however, be done often. Further, it should only be done either on behalf of the community (as in the case of those I have mentioned) or for revenge (as in the case of the two Luculli) or to fulfil a patron's obligation (as I did for the Sicilians, and Julius in prosecuting Albucius for the Sardinians).[1] Again, the diligence showed by Lucius Fufius in prosecuting Manius Aquillius is recognized. It is a thing to be done once, then; certainly not

[1] Prosecution was the common way to make one's oratorical debut. Crassus was twenty-one (see p. 80, n. 2), Publius Sulpicius twenty; Marcus Antonius' first speech is unknown. C., who started with a defence, felt the need for excuses when prosecuting Verres at the age of thirty-six. Crassus' victim Carbo, like Sulpicius', was regarded by the Optimates as 'unsound'; the Luculli were avenging their father; C. and C. Julius Caesar Strabo were protecting the interests of the provinces they had governed.